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Smallpox vaccine: its use and safety over
time
The history of smallpox vaccination dates back to
1796, when Edward Jenner demonstrated that sub-
jects inoculatedwith cowpoxwere resistant to small-
pox. At that time, the disease was present among all
classes of European society, and Jenner soon had
many followers. By the turn of the 19th century,
vaccination to prevent smallpox had become wide-
spread throughout the industrialized countries and
some of their colonies, and the incidence of smallpox
in these countries was decreasing. The production of
smallpox vaccine was undertaken by various govern-
ment and private laboratories, the precursors of the
biopharma industry. Some time prior to this, it
appears that the virus used for vaccination against
smallpox was either intentionally or accidentally
changed from cowpox to another member of the
orthopoxvirus family, now know as vaccinia.1
Primary vaccination with vaccinia virus is asso-
ciated with complications that range from vaccinial
eruption at sites of the body that are or have pre-
viously been eczematous to generalized vaccinia
infection and post-vaccinal encephalitis leading to
permanent neurological disability or death.2—4 With
a case fatality ratio for post-vaccinal encephalitis of
approximately 30%, the risk of fatal complication
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Summary The emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases since the
eradication of smallpox has had a direct impact on preparedness for a deliber-
ately-caused smallpox outbreak, should one occur. The emergence of HIV has placed
restrictions on the safe and effective use of smallpox vaccines and made the need for
vaccinia immune globulin important for outbreak control. At the same time, the
threat of international spread of emerging and re-emerging infections has prompted
global investments in surveillance and response mechanisms such as the Global
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), a mechanism that would enhance
the world’s collaboration in smallpox containment as it did during the recent outbreak
of SARS. Though global preparedness for a deliberately-caused smallpox outbreak has
increased with the creation of GOARN, it does not replace the need for increased
national public health investment to expand surge capacity for the management of
patients and their contacts and to strengthen emergency communication networks to
ensure effective response.
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from smallpox vaccine is approximately 1 permillion
doses of vaccine administered. Strains of vaccinia
virus used in vaccine preparation differed from
country to country during the 20th century until
eradication was completed and vaccine production
was stopped; different strains appeared to be asso-
ciated with different levels of complication, com-
plications being most severe in children under the
age of 2 years.1
Despite the known risk of complications from
smallpox vaccination, the risk-benefit analysis at
the beginning of 1967, when the intensified smallpox
eradication program was launched, reached an
obvious conclusion: smallpox remained endemic in
31 countries, an estimated 2 to 3 million persons in
these countries would die from smallpox that year,
and countless others would be left with severe facial
scarring, corneal scarring and blindness.1 Vaccination
was the cornerstone for achieving eradication. If this
goal could be reached, millions of lives would be
saved and untold suffering spared. Eradication would
also allow a halt to vaccination, resulting in enormous
financial savings.5 The prevention of vaccination-
associated complications and deaths was yet another
benefit, but was seen as secondary to the much
greater goal of ridding the world of one of its oldest
and most dreaded infectious diseases.
From 1967 to 1978, the intensified smallpox era-
dication strategy evolved from mass campaigns to
vaccinate entire populations, to vaccination of popu-
lations at risk — persons in contact with a smallpox
patientor living inhouseholds encircling thepatient’s
home, a strategy now commonly referred to as ‘‘ring
vaccination’’. The strategy also helpedovercomeone
of the greatest obstacles to smallpoxeradication: the
constant shortage of vaccine supplies. Containment
was further facilitated by use of a heat-stable small-
pox vaccine and the development of the bifurcated
needle that used four times less vaccine than con-
ventional vaccination procedures. The long incuba-
tion period of smallpox (12—14 days on average) was
yet another advantage, as vaccination within four
days of exposure prevented or attenuated disease.6,7
The risk-benefit analysis changed in 1980 when
smallpox became the first disease in history to be
eradicated. In its final report, the Global Commis-
sion for the Certification of Smallpox Eradication
weighed the risk of vaccine-associated complica-
tions against the risk of smallpox infection and
recommended that vaccination be discontinued in
every country.7 Further confidence that smallpox
was now a disease of the past was expressed the
following year, when the World Health Assembly
amended the International Health Regulations to
exclude reporting requirements for smallpox.8
Stocks of variola virus held in laboratories around
the world posed the greatest risk that smallpox
might return, and this risk was dramatically illu-
strated by a laboratory accident, resulting in a fatal
case of smallpox in the United Kingdom in 1978. That
highly-publicized event persuaded national autho-
rities to either destroy virus stocks or transfer them
for safe-keeping to designated high-security WHO
collaborating centers. The Global Commission cited
scientific reasons for preserving virus stocks, and by
1984, all known stocks of variola virus had been
consolidated at two centers, in the USA and the
former Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation,
where they remain today.9
The Global Commission also recommended that
WHO maintain a reserve of smallpox vaccine suffi-
cient to vaccinate 200 million people as prudent
preparation for ‘‘unforeseen circumstances’’. A
committee on orthopoxvirus infections, established
following the certification of eradication, was
entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing vac-
cine distribution during an emergency.7,10 In 1986,
the committee considered that ‘‘unforeseen cir-
cumstances’’ had become so unlikely that WHO no
longer needed to maintain such a large reserve,
which was costly to store.11 As a result, the reserve
was reduced to the present stockpile of 2.5 million
doses of potent vaccine and a small supply of bifur-
cated needles. Vaccine in this reserve has not been
replaced by second-generation vaccines that have
recently been produced. Although the vaccine is
outdated, routine titration for viral activity indi-
cates that potency has been maintained.
In order to treat adverse reactions to smallpox
vaccination during the period of smallpox eradica-
tion, countriesmaintained stocks of vaccinia immune
globulin (VIG) for use in treating personswith adverse
reactions to smallpox vaccine. VIG was prepared by
pooling of plasma from recently vaccinated humans
and was widely available as an injectable immu-
noglobulin. After certification of eradication no
international stockpile of VIG was constituted nor
maintained, and national stockswere not renewed as
they decreased in potency.
In 1981,within a year following the certification of
smallpox eradication, AIDS was identified for the first
time in the United States; the international spread
that would rapidly lead to endemicity had already
begun. In 1984, the US practice of vaccinating mili-
tary personnel as protection against the possible use
of variola virus as a biological weapon led to recogni-
tion of a fatal link between smallpox andAIDS. In that
year, a young military recruit with latent HIV infec-
tion developed generalized vaccinia and died fol-
lowing smallpox vaccination.12 This demonstration
of the fatal potential of smallpox vaccination in HIV-
infected persons suggests that, had AIDS emerged
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earlier, it would have undermined chances for the
eradication of a disease that depended on the exist-
ing vaccine as the cornerstone for control. At a
minimum, evaluation of HIV status would have been
required prior to vaccination, and those who were at
risk of HIVor had tested positive could not have been
vaccinated. An alternative protective measure such
as isolation, vaccinia immune globulin (VIG) or some
other type of prophylaxis would have been required,
thus adding greatly to the costs and logistic complex-
ities of theeradication campaign. In somedeveloping
countries with high prevalence of HIV and limited
resources for HIV testing, case isolation and contact
tracing without vaccination may have been the only
option.
The threat of emerging and re-emerging
infectious diseases: national and global
investments for public health security
The AIDS virus is only one of more than 40 infectious
disease agents newly identified over the past three
decades.13 These agents have caused diseases ran-
ging from the Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers
to hepatitis C, Nipah virus encephalitis, E. coliO157,
and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. The SARS
coronavirus is the most recent — and perhaps one
of the most highly publicized — addition to this list.
Outbreaks of three emerging and re-emerging
infectious diseases during the last decade of the
20th century— cholera in Latin America, pneumonic
plague in India, and Ebola hemorrhagic fever in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo — caused great
international concern for public health security.
They demonstrated the consequences that delayed
national recognition and response to outbreaks
could have: suffering and death of national popula-
tions including health workers, potential spread to
other countries, and significant disruptions to tra-
vel, trade and economies.14
Outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging infec-
tious diseases have also pointed to the need for
global surveillance and response mechanisms to
detect and contain the international spread of these
naturally occurring emerging and re-emerging
infectious diseases. As a result, investments in sur-
veillance and response have been made at both
national and global levels. One such global invest-
ment is the WHO-coordinated Global Outbreak Alert
and Response Network (GOARN). Set up in 1997 and
formalized in 2000, GOARN is a network of over 120
surveillance and response partners world-wide that
helps identify, confirm and respond to more than 50
naturally occurring outbreaks in developing coun-
tries each year.15—17 These outbreaks range from
predictable recurrences of epidemic meningitis and
cholera to unpredictable outbreaks such as SARS and
cases of human infection with H5N1 avian influenza.
GOARN provides the world with a safety net when
national surveillance and response mechanisms fail
to detect, report or contain infectious diseases with
the potential for international spread.
Added to the heightened concerns around natu-
rally occurring emerging and re-emerging infectious
disease, have been concerns that infectious disease
agents might be used deliberately to cause harm and
terror. This concern was confirmed in the United
States of America in 2001 when anthrax spores were
sent through the US postal system.18 Now, just over
two years later, preparedness and surveillance for
deliberately caused infectious disease outbreaks
have become high on the list of national defence
and security concerns, and bio-terrorism has moved
from a theoretical risk to a distinct possibility.
Increasing global preparedness and
response capacity for smallpox
Debates about the possible deliberate use of the
smallpox virus to cause harm and terror have taken
place in several countries.19 At the request of these
countries, and with consensus of all 192 WHO mem-
ber countries, WHO has prolonged the period until
destruction of existing smallpox virus stocks and
established a scientific advisory committee to over-
see a research and development agenda that
requires use of live smallpox virus.20 This agenda
includes research and development of new and safer
smallpox vaccines, effective anti-virals and more
specific diagnostic tests.21
WHO has also reconvened the ad hoc advisory
committee on orthopox infections, placed the com-
mittee’s updated guidance for smallpox contain-
ment on the web, and is taking measures to begin
to replace at least part of its stockpile of smallpox
vaccine with second generation vaccine and bifur-
cated needles. At the same time, several countries
are investing in national stockpiles of smallpox vac-
cine and bifurcated needles as a preparedness mea-
sure and possible deterrent, and in vaccinia immune
globulin (VIG) for use as treatment in persons with
severe adverse reactions to smallpox vaccination, or
for prophylaxis in HIV-infected persons who may
have been exposed to smallpox.
The performance of GOARN during the SARS out-
break demonstrated the strength of international
outbreak response mechanisms that would also
be critical in containing a deliberately-caused out-
break.22 During the response to SARS, GOARN linked
some of the world’s best laboratory scientists,
Smallpox containment updated: considerations for the 21st century S17
clinicians, and epidemiologists in virtual electronic
and telephone/video networks that rapidly pro-
vided real time knowledge about the causative
agent, management of those infected, mode of
transmission, and other epidemiological features.
By the time the outbreak had been fully contained,
152 experts from institutions in 17 different coun-
tries had become part of these networks as they
responded at sites where the outbreak was under
way, or worked with the causative agent in labora-
tories distant from these sites. The networks pro-
vided the real-time information that made it
possible for WHO to provide specific guidance to
health workers about clinical management, to pub-
lic health authorities about effective containment
measures and to airport authorities and interna-
tional travellers about the risks of infection asso-
ciated with travellers.22,23
The similarities between SARS and smallpox
are striking. Like smallpox, SARS is transmitted by
droplets through close person-to-person contact. In
the SARS outbreak, health care workers were initi-
ally at greatest risk of infection, just as first respon-
ders would be in the event of smallpox or other
deliberately-caused outbreaks. A relatively long
incubation period allowed SARS to spread interna-
tionally in unsuspecting air travellers, as would also
be the case with smallpox. National containment
activities of case finding, isolation and infection
control, contact tracing and surveillance of contacts
were effective in containing the SARS outbreak,
just as they would be in the control of a smallpox
outbreak. The effectiveness of such activities for
smallpox, however, would be augmented by the
availability of an effective vaccine, bifurcated nee-
dles and VIG. The GOARN mechanism will continue
to play a role in the control of infectious disease
outbreaks of international importance, be they
naturally occurring or deliberately caused, and
would be called into play should there be an out-
break of smallpox.
Strengthening global surveillance
capacity for smallpox
WHO intermittently receives rumours of smallpox
outbreaks from various sources. Since 1997 these
rumours have been confirmed and responded to
through the GOARN mechanism. Between 1 January
2000 and 15 July 2002 GOARN received 8 reports of
suspected smallpox from 5 different WHO Regions.
One of those reports was confirmed as accidental
exposure to vaccinia virus in which 8 children were
hospitalised with generalized vaccinia. Two reports
were confirmed as varicella, and one as measles.
For four suspected cases, the causative agent could
not be identified, but clinical features were not
consistent with a diagnosis of smallpox.
Along with these reports were 25 reports of
suspected human monkeypox, all but one from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo where fre-
quent transmission continues to occur as the mean
age of those not vaccinated for smallpox continues
to increase. The GOARN response to these monkey-
pox outbreaks, and several that occurred before
2000, has provided support for their investigation
and containment.
National surge capacity and the need for
enhanced communication
GOARN is a global mechanism that serves as a safety
net when national surveillance and response fail or
require support. From its repeated response to dis-
eases such as epidemic meningitis and yellow fever,
GOARN has also acquired logistic experience using
mechanisms such as vaccine stockpiles and systems
for rapid distribution during emergencies. GOARN
cannot, however, provide the increased surge capa-
city that would be required within countries follow-
ing a terrorist attack using an agent such as variola
virus, the emergence of a severe new disease such as
SARS, or a major disease event such as the emer-
gence of a pandemic strain of the influenza virus.
For example, SARS overwhelmed health systems in
many countries not only because health workers
became infected and died, but also because infra-
structure was insufficient to treat and isolate all
those infected, and to trace and monitor close
contacts of patients.24
Global pandemics of influenza during the 20th
century have similarly overburdened patient man-
agement facilities and the public health support
system.25 A deliberately caused infectious disease
outbreak of a transmissible agent could be of much
higher magnitude, and might easily overwhelm
existing national infrastructure. Countries must
increase their surge capacity for infectious disease
outbreaks, possibly linking it to surge capacities
being enhanced for other emergency events such
as natural or human-caused disasters, in order to be
prepared.
Likewise, though GOARN mobilizes and maintains
real-time networks of experts globally and provides
information to WHO for global dissemination
through the world wide web and other information
outlets during infectious disease outbreaks, there is
a need for enhanced national communication capa-
city. This need is especially critical in countries
with federal systems of government where health
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responsibility has been decentralized to the state
or provincial level. Difficulties in communication
between states or provinces and the central level
during the SARS outbreak at times resulted in delays
in reporting, confusion, and in some instances
open disagreements among health professionals
and politicians working at various levels of state,
provincial and national.24 To be prepared for delib-
erately caused outbreaks of smallpox or other infec-
tious agents, tried and proven communication
systems must be developed and maintained, per-
haps linked with national disaster or other emer-
gency communication systems.
Conclusion: The need for investment in
public health infrastructure
At the beginning of the 21st century, the world has
experienced three infectious disease events that
threatened public health security: the deliberate
release of anthrax in 2001, the emergence and
subsequent spread of SARS in 2003, and the threat
of an influenza pandemic in early 2004. The anthrax
outbreak in the United States incited terror that
rapidly spread around the world, and stimulated
efforts to prepare for the much more deadly situa-
tion that would arise should variola virus be the
agent used in a bioterrorist attack. It also resulted in
modelling exercises with predictions about the
impact that could be caused by a severe and trans-
missible disease with no effective cure, in a highly
mobile, interdependent and widely interconnected
world.
SARS showed the validity of those predictions.
However, unlike when AIDS was first identified and
rapidly established endemicity, the public health
community was prepared to recognize the signifi-
cance of SARS, and ready to collaborate in a global
effort to prevent it from becoming established as
yet another endemic threat to health.
Bioterrorism, emerging infectious diseases, and
influenza pandemics share two characteristics: their
unpredictability and their capacity to endanger
public health security when they do occur. Interna-
tional mechanisms such as GOARN strengthened
the global response to SARS. These international
mechanisms are again being strengthened by the
development of influenza pandemic preparedness
plans in response to human cases of H5N1 avian
influenza in Asia. The measures now being explored
are the same as those needed to protect public
health security should smallpox be used deliberately
in an act of bioterrorism. They include increasing
national surge capacity, rapid and increased produc-
tion of vaccine, stockpiling of antivirals, improve-
ment of global surveillance capacity and evaluation
of the effectiveness of international travel recom-
mendations.
With each threat caused by an infections disease,
the arguments for investing in public health infra-
structures have been strengthened. Experiences at
the start of this century are providing compelling
evidence that such investments are a wise way to
protect the world against events that are unpre-
dictable and have potentially enormous conse-
quences for health, societies, and economies.
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